No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism
Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical realism. Secondly, I will argue that metaphysical realists must commit to metaphysical anthropocentrism in order to solve Putnam’s problem. Thirdly, I will argue that metaphysical anthropocentrism requires monotheism. Lastly, I argue that metaphysical realism is true. Therefore, we must be ontologically committed to God.
- How to Cite
Gafvelin, Åke. (2021). No God, no God’s Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism. Conatus - Journal of Philosophy, 6(1), 83–100. https://doi.org/10.12681/cjp.24930
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