Religious zealot or strategical realist? Oliver Cromwell and the Irish Campaign, 1649-1650
Abstract
“He who could take Drogheda, could take Hell”.
This phrase, attributed to Sir Phelim O’Neill following the fall of the city in September 1649 to the New Model Army under Oliver Cromwell, succinctly captures the psychological impact of the massacre of Drogheda’s garrison and inhabitants on the Irish collective consciousness. Cromwell’s campaign in Ireland (1649-1650) remains one of the most contentious episodes of the English Revolutionary period, marked by extreme military violence and leaving a profound legacy in the political and ethno-religious configuration of the island.
The consequences of the campaign were far-reaching: mass executions, forced displacements, colonization, and the entrenchment of a colonial logic of domination that would be replicated across future territories of the English empire. The memory of these events endured for centuries, shaping Irish identity and contributing to the eventual partition of the island.
This study focuses on the interpretive problem of the violence exercised by Cromwell during the campaign. Despite extensive scholarly work, the historiographical debate remains unsettled: were the massacres in cities such as Drogheda and Wexford the result of religious zealotry, or a calculated strategy of deterrence? Were they directed solely at combatants, or also at civilians?
Drawing from the historiographical tension between historians such as Micheál Ó Siochrú — who emphasizes the religious dimension — and others, like Trevor Royle and Tom Reilly — who frame the events as strategic or subject them to revisionist interpretations —, this article seeks to reposition the debate within a framework of comparative analysis.
The central research question is: How did the intensity and nature of violence evolve over the course of the campaign, and what factors — strategic, ideological, or political — shaped Cromwell’s decisions?
The study examines the sieges of Drogheda and Wexford, where large-scale massacres occurred, in contrast with the cases of Ross and Clonmel, where resistance was suppressed through more restrained or distinct means. Its aim is to assess whether Cromwell’s use of violence was the outcome of Puritan zeal, an instrument of state power, or a combination of both. Ireland, in this context, served as a testing ground for a model of conquest that would later inform British imperial practices in the age of colonial expansion.
Article Details
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Georgakakis, P. (2025). Religious zealot or strategical realist? Oliver Cromwell and the Irish Campaign, 1649-1650. Mos Historicus: A Critical Review of European History, 3(1), 47–67. https://doi.org/10.12681/mh.43999
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