In Favor of Moral Pluralism: Man's Epistemological Limits and the Nature of Moral Values
Abstract
This paper provides an epistemological defense of moral pluralism, positioning it as a middle ground between moral monism and relativism. The author argues that moral pluralism rejects the monist claim of a single, supreme value or universal hierarchy, while also avoiding the "chaos" of relativism by grounding morality in a limited objectivity. This objectivity is established through the "common ownership" of human nature—a cross-cultural and diachronic study of human needs and characteristics. The text explores the cognitive limits of human knowledge, asserting that ethical truths must be logically recognizable and founded on human inductive reasoning, which is neither purely private nor exclusively public. By examining the "inherence" of human nature, the author concludes that while universal human needs exist, they often demand contradictory things, thereby making moral perfection impossible and rendering monism an unsustainable position.
Article Details
- How to Cite
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Glyniadaki, C. (2020). In Favor of Moral Pluralism: Man’s Epistemological Limits and the Nature of Moral Values. Ηθική. Περιοδικό φιλοσοφίας, (3), 50–56. https://doi.org/10.12681/ethiki.22658
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- No. 3 (2007)
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