The game of truth and falsehood in the Aristotelian treatise De Anima and the interpretation of Simplicius

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Published: Mar 25, 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.12681/ethiki.22778
Keywords:
Aristotle; Simplicius; De Anima (On the Soul); Truth and Falsehood; Intellect (Nous); Sensation (Aisthesis); Imagination (Phantasia); Neoplatonism
Alexandra P. Ntotsika
Abstract

This article investigates the philosophical "game" between truth and falsehood as presented in Aristotle's De Anima (On the Soul) and later interpreted by the Neoplatonist commentator Simplicius. The first part of the study explores the structure of the Aristotelian work, focusing on how truth and error relate to the faculties of sensation (aisthesis), imagination (phantasia), and intellect (nous). The second part examines Simplicius’s commentary, highlighting his Neoplatonic shift: while Aristotle views truth as something shaped within human cognition, Simplicius identifies absolute truth with the "higher intellect," a transcendent principle of Platonic origin. The author concludes that for Simplicius, the soul achieves truth by ascending toward this divine intellect, whereas falsehood arises from the soul's entanglement with the material world and sensory fragmentation.

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