The predicate fabric of abstraction: the hard test of logical inversion

Abstract

The paper starts with an ultra-compact deposition on the two ubiquitous
complementary dual pairwise organized methodological procedures
of episteme, i.e. the analytic method (analysis – synthesis)
& the abstract process (abstraction – structure). Next, the authors examine
some ground rules and concepts pervading causality and inference and
their junctions, attempting to discriminate between information flow in
empiricism and theoretical causality of proof; only then is a connection
between them attempted and investigated. In the authors’ effort to establish
a consistent theoretical outlook, if not approach, the technique of logical
inversions is also used as a partial yet powerful guide elucidating how successful
their attempts were. Apart from clarifying some opaque concepts in
logic, in set theory and in the staple empiricism of science, this paper also
sets the stage for questioning whether some grave flaws could be located
in traditional, save ill-founded, notions in hardcore science, on occasion of
the par excellence typical example of fundamental and never challenged approaches in physics. The fact that something has been accepted as holding
does not at all mean that cracks may not be located in its epistemological
makeup at some posterior time. And it is the text’s task here to ask some
painful questions and try to set some realistic boundaries to things by aptly
utilizing available irresistible standard «tricks» from logic and from the
classical scientific method and from reverting to fruitful techniques and to
telling examples, pushing hard for convincing answers.