Ο ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ ΠΑΓΚΑΛΟΣ ΚΑΙ Ο ΑΝΑΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΣΜΟΣ ΑΠΕΝΑΝΤΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΤΟΥΡΚΙΑ: Η ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΗ ΔΙΑΣΤΑΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΗΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΔΙΚΤΑΤΟΡΙΑΣ (1925-26)

Abstract

This article discusses the domestic dimension of Theodoros Pangalos’ revanchist foreign policy against Turkey. It argues that along with the constraints posed by the international environment, the problematic domestic legitimization of Pangalos’ revisionism constituted an equally important factor for its failure. Through the thorough examination of the contemporary press, two primary questions are examined: how did Pangalos try to cultivate his revisionist agenda in Greek society, and which were the reactions of the press, the political elite, and the public opinion. Although his intentions were clear and well-known, Pangalos did not articulate a systematic revisionist rhetoric partly because this could damage Greece’s international position and partly because he believed that the Great Idea (Megali Idea) had not faded from the value system of the Greeks. Nevertheless, he tried systematically to boost the patriotic sentiment of the people and to inspire confidence in his government; his warlike attitude in the Greek-Bulgarian crisis, his quasi-mystical militaristic rhetoric, and the excessive purchases of armaments in an era of economic austerity, all served that goal. However, revisionism aiming at the Treaty of Lausanne was expressed by some pro-government and nationalist newspapers. Even though the majority of the press and the political elites opposed Pangalos’ revisionist policy for fear that it would bring about additional territorial losses, especially in Macedonia, a part of the newly arrived refugees and some nationalistic circles seemed to support it. However, his opportunistic diplomatic maneuvers with Italy and Yugoslavia, and the deterioration of the economic situation deprived him of any popular support he enjoyed. Last but not least, Pangalos’ attempt to use the refugees, who saw him as their last hope to return to their homelands, and the army as the two pillars of his revanchist strategy failed because of the formers’ blind allegiance to Veniszelism and to its leader, E. Venizelos, and the latter’s fragmentation in rival factions. Conclusively, only three years after the Greek defeat in Asia Minor, the Great Idea still inspired a part of the Greek society, but the dawning post-war era posed new socio-political challenges to the European leaders, challenges which demanded new methods of achieving domestic legitimacy.