Εκλογές τοπικής αυτοδιοίκησης 2006: το εκλογικό όριο του 42%: πολιτικές συνέπειες και προεκτάσεις

Abstract

The local government elections of October 2006 in Greece were held with an electoral system of a relative majority of 42%, instead of the absolute majority system in two rounds that was previously in effect. Each electoral reform is supposed to affect the behavior of politicians, parties and voters. The new electoral system possibly affects the way that the control of major local government organizations is distributed among the two major parties, PASOK and New Democracy, the electoral strength of bipartisanism versus the electoral strength of the left-wing parties, as well as political pluralism, both in terms of political supply and political demand. In the present article, dealing with each one of the above possible consequences as a research working hypothesis, we conclude, through the analysis of electoral results, that the electoral limit of 42% bolsters bipartisanism and adds to the shrinkage of left-wing parties’ electoral appeal, without, however, affecting political correlations at the party level. At the same time, it seems that the electoral reform depresses local electoral pluralism, leading to a reduction in the number of co- operational candidacies and to the decrease of the electoral appeal of candidates who do not have ufficiai partisan support.