Η διάκριση μεταξύ θετικής και αρνητικής ελευθερίας κατά τον Isaiah Berlin και ο ορισμός της ελευθερίας ως αρνητικής ιδέας

Abstract

The paper focuses on Isaiah Berlin’s discussion of liberty. It considers the common distinction between positive and negative liberty associated with his name, in the perspective of the definition of liberty as a negative idea, which Berlin borrowed from Bentham and Hobbes. An attempt is made to trace the different contexts within which the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ as applied to liberty change their meaning. Liberty as a negative idea entails the absence of coercion (constraint and restraint) and consequently of law, while negative liberty often presupposes the operation of law by virtue of which ‘negative’ rights are established through the imposition of duties of non-interference. Different conceptions of liberty then emerge when the terms ‘positive-negative’ refer to a) the existence of an obligation as such b) the form of obligation, i.e. the existence of an obligation to do or forebear and c) the content of an obligation. On the other hand, the link forged by Berlin between positive liberty, that is liberty as self-government and totalitarianism is disputed. Drawing on historical evidence it is shown that this conception underlines the doctirne of political participation and forms an essential part of a genuine liberal tradition of political thought. Within this tradition political participation has been defended as a good in itself and a precondition of political morality, as well as a necessary requirement for securing individual liberties. To ignore this dimension means to impoverish a reverend tradition of political thinking for the sake of ideological purity.