Συνταγματική δικαιοσύνη στην Ελλάδα

Abstract

The introduction of a Constitutional Court (found in several other legal orders) in Greece, understandably following a constitutional revision, is imperative. Only such a permanent and specialized judicial organ, that will be comprised of a small number of jurists of acknowledged authority and will be strictly non- partisan, is in a position to secure a unitary and uniform, authentic and convincing judgment on the constitutionality of laws. The current system providing for coincidental controls of the constitutionality of the regulation to be applied on each occasion, from the occasionally relevant court, often on the first level, leads to chronic fluctuations of case laws, uncertainty of law, the late reversal of created situations and the deception of the citizens’ trust. Therefore, it has a negative impact on social coexistence, economic planning and investment. The centralized control of constitutionality has to be effected mainly in a preventive way, provided that after the adoption but before the publication of the law, it is requested by certain higher state organs or a group of at least 50 Members of Parliament, according to the successful model of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, in order to avert the insertion of unconstitutional clauses to the legal order. It could also be realized ex post, after a referential decision of the court where the constitutionality dilemma appears. This Constitutional Court should also be given all the competencies pertaining, under article 100 of the Constitution, to the Highest Special Court, as well as certain competencies that currently relate to the Independent Authorities. In addition, it should be assigned the trial of certain ‘constitutional appeals’, according to the model of the German Verfassunsgericht.