The comparative political economy of risk sharing in the banking union.


Published: Dec 22, 2025
Keywords:
Germany; Spain; Single Resolution Fund; Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive; Banking Union;
Konstantinos Kazantzis
Napoleon Maravegias
Abstract

What explains the incompatibility of the German and Spanish Governments’ risk-sharing preferences in the European Banking Union? This article attempts to answer this question employing the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, emphasizing that the preferences of the governments of the two countries were shaped by their domestic banking interests. In particular, it is argued that the positions of the German and Spanish banking associations representing the private and public banks of the two countries were influenced by the structure and risk profile of the banks they represented, while pointing out that their role in shaping the preferences of their governments was crucial.

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Author Biographies
Konstantinos Kazantzis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

PhD, Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Napoleon Maravegias, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Professor Emeritus, Department of Political Science and Public Administration

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