Διαφθορά και κρατική εξουσία

Abstract

The concentration of all state power in the hands of government and, especially of the Prime Minister (since he is the one who chooses and replaces the ministers), constitutes an antinomy of our parliamentary regime. The lack of institutional counterbalances that would control but, at the same time, legitimize government initiatives constitutes a weakness paralyzing government action. Because of this deficiency, the government is forced to seek non-institutional support from the media, publishers, fund holders etc. The latter demand, in the form of an illegitimate exchange, preferential opportunities for enrichment, for example through the assignment of public works and procurements or through monopolies and tax exemptions. Thus, equality before the law is abolished and corruption becomes embedded in the public space. Therefore, there is a need for institutional counterbalances, meaning bodies which, according to the principle of checks and balances, will curb and counterbalance government power. Only in this way will government power regain its balance and democratic legitimization, and consequently acquire the ability to confront the problems of our times, including state corruption. The article concludes with suggestions in this direction.