Μετά το "μνημόνιο συνεννόησης" με ΔΝΤ, ΕΚΤ και Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή: Μεταρρυθμίσεις σε συνθήκες εξωτερικών περιορισμών

Abstract

To avoid bankruptcy in May 2010, the Greek government entered an agreement with the IMF and the EU. In exchange for an unprecedented support lending of 110 billion Euros in three years, the government committed itself to implementing a wide-ranging program of fiscal consolidation and essentially liberal economic reforms. The program, recorded in a ‘memorandum of understanding', arguably marks the end of the so-called post-dictatorship period (‘metapolitefsi’) during which a set of rules and practices subsumed under the term statism has been firmly established. The result has been high dependency on foreign borrowing, accumulated debts and worsening balance of payments indicating a heavy loss of competitiveness. As elementary public choice considerations warn, the now agreed program is loaded with uncertainties. It confronts strong domestic resistance arising from the populist tradition of the governing party, the ‘war of attrition’ of powerful interests and anti-liberal undercurrents in the broader public. Reform implementation suffers also under weak state institutions unable to develop reasonable compensation schemes. Economically seen, it is definitely not clear whether fiscal restraint is the right answer to heavy indebtedness which implies that a preferably ‘organized’ restructuring will be necessary- the sooner the better.